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Abstract: The contribution of social partnership to Ireland’s economic boom remains the subject of
controversy. This paper analyses at a theoretical level how a multi-period deal on wages and
taxation of the type struck in the late 1980s could enhance competitiveness and facilitate an
economy in escaping from fiscal crisis. Such a deal would not be possible in a spot labour market.
The high unemployment rates of the late 1980s suggest that the Irish labour market of the time
cannot be characterised as a spot labour market, however, and such a deal could be struck under
these circumstances. Short-term tax reductions would have worsened the short-term budgetary
position and hence would have been politically unacceptable. An agreement entailing a
commitment by government to future tax reductions in exchange for current wage moderation on
the part of organised labour imparts a supply-side stimulus to the economy and improves the
immediate fiscal position. The concluding comments provide a gloomy assessment of whether
partnership could play an equivalent role in the current recessionary environment.
I INTRODUCTION
O
f all the factors commonly cited as having contributed to Ireland’s
dramatically improved economic performance of the last two decades,
social partnership remains the most controversial. Teahon (1997/98) – one of
the civil servants involved in the development of the process – argues that
partnership promoted a shared understanding of key economic mechanisms
and relationships, while MacSharry (2000, page 62) – the Finance Minister
who presided over the expenditure cuts of the 1987-89 period – credits the
1
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the fiscal consolidation. 
Prior to the emergence of partnership, as described by Hardiman (1994),
no single bargaining group believed it had to pay attention to the impact of its
activities on the overall state of economic performance. Divisions within the
trade union movement contributed to the extent of wage inflation and the
scale of industrial conflict. This closely conforms to the type of industrial
relations system identified by Calmfors and Driffill (1988) as associated with
the poorest macroeconomic outcomes. Citing Olson (1982), they note that
organised interests are most harmful when they are strong enough to cause
major disruptions but not sufficiently encompassing to bear a significant
fraction of the societal costs associated with pressing their own claims.
Partnership, according to this perspective, was sufficiently encompassing that
participants were forced to take into account the macroeconomic consequences
of the pay deals struck.1
In terms of possible impacts on wage formation and unemployment,
however, Fitz Gerald (1999) draws on econometric modelling of the Irish
labour market to argue that partnership merely validated the results which
market forces made inevitable. O’Leary (2006) is more hostile still.
Extrapolating from Fitz Gerald’s “open labour market” model, he contends
that tax changes would be fully passed through to wages, with no need for
partnership as a conduit. If the partnership process raised public-sector pay at
the time – as he suggests – this would have reduced the potential for tax
reductions and impacted adversely on competitiveness.2
One problem with these accounts however relates to timing. Figure 1
shows that Irish unemployment began to fall towards UK levels well before
the labour-market tax wedge began its secular decline.3,4 A more fundamental
problem is that the underlying assumption of a “spot labour market” in these
analyses precludes any possibility that the offer of future tax cuts could induce
2 THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL REVIEW
1 Generally, beneficial institutional innovations might be thought to have as their purpose the
resolution of prisoners’ dilemmas. 
2 He also disputes Fitz Gerald’s suggestion that the process may have helped to bring about a more
orderly labour market, arguing that the concurrent decline in strike activity in Ireland merely
reflected broader international trends.
3 The tax wedge in the figure is defined as (1+ RGTYSE)/(1- RTYPTOT), where RGTYSE is the
average rate of employer social insurance contributions and RTYPTOT is the average rate of
personal taxation, including social insurance paid by employees. I am grateful to John Fitz Gerald
for providing these data. Nickell (2003) sums the payroll tax, income tax and consumption tax
rates to yield another measure of the wedge. For Ireland, this measure stood at 23 per cent for the
period 1960-64, 30 per cent for 1965-79, 37 per cent for 1980-87, 41 per cent for 1988-95, and fell
to 33 per cent for 1996-2000.
4 It is recognised of course that a range of other factors besides the tax wedge would have impacted
on unemployment.
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politically negotiated process.5 Yet this was a key element of the agreements.
The first partnership agreement, the Programme for National Recovery
(1987), stated for example that “… an appropriate pattern of pay
developments has an essential part to play in the success of this Programme.
Lower income taxation and a low level of inflation can help to bring about
more moderate pay expectations. It is for this reason that this Government as
part of tax reform under the Programme intend to make the income tax
reductions outlined in Section 3.”
The open-labour-market model furthermore, at least in O’Leary’s
interpretation, posits a more or less perfectly elastic supply of labour as the
mechanism by which tax reductions can generate substantial improvements in
wage competitiveness. Yet labour supply could not have been perfectly elastic,
given that unemployment in Ireland at the time of the first partnership
agreement in 1987 stood at almost 17 per cent.6 A comprehensive account of
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5 Walsh (2004), on the other hand, accepts that partnership could have paid dividends “… by
facilitating reductions in taxes on wage earners, and the backward shifting (of these reductions)
to employers”.
6 Unlike Fitz Gerald, O’Leary does not distinguish between the markets for skilled and unskilled
labour. 
Figure 1: Unemployment and the Irish Labour-Market Tax Wedge
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include a theory of how the long-standing excess of Irish over UK
unemployment shown in Figure 1 came to be reversed. 
In contrast to Fitz Gerald and O’Leary, Barry (2004) suggests that
partnership may have functioned – in its early stages at least – as a delivery
mechanism for future tax cuts offered in exchange for current wage
moderation. Barry and Devereux (1995) suggest that such a process could
have played a part in the supposed episode of “expansionary fiscal contraction”
(EFC) that some analysts argue to have characterised the response of the
economy to the fiscal consolidation of 1987. EFC is typically modelled as a
demand-side phenomenon. Regardless of the demand-side response, Barry
and Devereux speculate that a partnership deal of the type modelled here
could have given rise to a supply-side expansion. 
The aim of the present paper is to present a formal model of the process by
which a partnership-type agreement could have stimulated the economy and
to explore the extent to which it could have helped the economy emerge from
fiscal crisis. The focus is solely on the supply side (fiscal expenditure changes
are not considered) and the model is constructed to apply to the labour-market
conditions that prevailed in the early years of partnership. The paper has
nothing to say about the consequences of partnership under full employment
conditions, though there is some speculation towards the end of the paper as
to why partnership may not be able to generate an equivalent response under
the recessionary conditions prevailing in the Ireland of 2008/09. Our definition
of “fiscal crisis” draws on the EFC literature (e.g. Miller, Skidelsky and Weller,
1990; Bertola and Drazen, 1993; and Sutherland, 1997). It refers to a situation
where government debt is close to some critical level that will trigger a
dramatic increase in the risk premium on government bonds. 
The next section of the paper introduces the monopoly union model
underlying the analysis. Section III presents the model in a two-period setting
in which future tax cuts are offered in exchange for current wage moderation.
Finally, since the model in the main section of the paper assumes a closed
labour market in order to keep the presentation as simple as possible, an
Appendix shows how the model can be extended to take international
migration into account.
II  A ONE-PERIOD MONOPOLY UNION MODEL
A single sector economy is assumed, with output produced via a Cobb-
Douglas production function.
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Prices are exogenous in line with the small open economy assumption, and
are set equal to one. K represents the economy’s stock of capital and L the level
of employment. The elasticity of labour demand associated with Cobb-Douglas
production is:
εLD = –1/α (2)
The monopoly union chooses a wage w to maximise its objective function
Ω, taking into account the impact of wages on labour demand.  
Ω = w(1 – t)L + b(N – L) (3)
where t is the rate of income tax, b the utility of leisure and N the size of
the labour force.7
The resulting wage is
w = b/[(1 – α)(1 – t)] (4)
This union-determined wage exceeds the opportunity cost of labour b,
yielding initial unemployment of N – L. The logic of the model is that the
union behaves like any monopolist, essentially restricting supply in order to
drive up the price received (which is the wage rate in the present case). The
impact on wages of a change in the tax rate is given by
dw/dt = b(1 – α) / [(1 – α)(1 – t)]2  > 0 (5)
A reduction in the tax rate reduces wage demands, leading to an increase
in employment and a corresponding reduction in unemployment. Government
tax revenues T are given by
T = twL (6)
The impact of a tax change on tax revenue is: 
dT/dt = [bL/α(1 – α)(1 – t)2] (α –t ) ( 7 )
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7 A standard work week is assumed, with workers either employed or unemployed. For more on
the monopoly union model see Oswald (1985). Oswald’s use of a general functional form and
assumption of risk aversion on the part of the union makes it impossible to sign some of the
competing substitution and income effects of interest.
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income-tax rate. By coincidence, the OECD Economic Outlook database
records a value of 25 per cent for the profit share in the business sector in
Ireland in 1987 while the ESRI database records a value of 25 per cent for the
average rate of personal taxation (including the social insurance contribution
of employees) for that year.8 Hence, in this basic model the impact on tax
revenues is close to zero. The determinants of the sign of this derivative will
be different in the two-period model presented in the next section of the paper.
This is important as we will impose a political restriction on fiscal-crisis
policies such that they must not reduce current tax revenues. 
III  THE TWO-PERIOD SOCIAL PARTNERSHIP MODEL
We add subscripts 1 and 2 to distinguish between first-period (short-run)
and second-period (long-run) values. Production in each period is given by
Y1 = AK1
αL1
1–α and    Y2 = AK2
αL2
1–α (8)
The short-run capital stock is fixed while period-one investment, I, (where
I = K2 – K1) allows the long-run capital stock to vary.
The firm chooses labour inputs in each period, alongside period-one
investment, to maximise its discounted stream of net revenues:
Π = Y1 –I  –  c [ I 2/2K1] – w1L1 + R[Y2 – w2L2]( 9 )
The term c[I2/2K1] represents capital-adjustment costs where the internal
marginal adjustment cost is an increasing function of investment relative to
the initial capital stock, as is common in the theory of the firm.9 The time
preference rate is set equal to the fixed foreign interest rate, which enters the
analysis through the assumption of international capital mobility. The interest
factor R is one divided by one plus the foreign interest rate.
First and second-period employment levels are determined by
w1 = A (L1/K1)–α (10)
6 THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL REVIEW
8 Lane (1997/8) discusses the evolution of capital’s share in Ireland employing the OECD
Economic Outlook database.
9 This formulation is equivalent to Tobin’s q theory of investment; see e.g. Hayashi (1982). Without
adjustment costs the model would be overdetermined since the international rate of return on
capital (which is internationally traded) would tie down the capital-labour ratio and hence the
wage.
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w2 = A (L2/K2)–α (11)
and the optimal level of investment is:
I = K1[Rα (L2/K2)1–α – 1]/c (12)
The structure of the model is quite simple. The first-period wage –
however determined – yields first-period employment via Equation (10) since
first-period capital is fixed. The second-period wage then ties down the second-
period capital-labour ratio via Equation (11), which then yields the level of
investment via Equation 12, and hence the second-period capital stock. This
in turn yields the long-run employment level. 
The partnership process entails a multi-period wage agreement such that
w1 = w2. Hence the wage subscripts can be dropped. The union now maximises
the intertemporal version of its objective function Ω, as given in Equation (13),
again taking into account the impact of wages on labour demand (via the
Cobb-Douglas production functions).  
Ω = w(1 – t1)L1 + b(N – L1) + R[w(1 – t2)L2 + b(N – L2)] (13)
The union-determined wage that maximises Ω is:
w = [b/[(1 – α)] [1 + R(L2/L1)] / [(1 – t1) + R(L2/ L1)(1 – t2)] (14)
The rate of income tax in both periods, t1 and t2, affects the wage outcome.
Hence the model allows for the possibility of the government offering future
tax cuts in exchange for wage moderation. Such an agreement would not be
possible in the unorganised (“spot”) labour markets assumed by Fitz Gerald
and O’Leary. The logic of the process as modelled here is that the government
can use the fact that the labour market is organised (which is what generates
excess unemployment in the first place) to secure an intertemporal agreement
of this nature. The impact on wages of an increase in the first-period income-
tax rate is:
dw/dt1 = [b/(1 – α)] [1 + R(L2/ L1)] / [(1 – t1) + R(L2/ L1)(1 – t2)]2  >  0 (15)
Hence a reduction in the tax rate reduces wage demands, leading to an
increase in employment and a corresponding reduction in unemployment.
First-period government tax revenues T1 are given by
SOCIAL PARTNERSHIP, COMPETITIVENESS AND EXIT FROM FISCAL CRISIS 7
01 Barry Article:ESRI Vol 38  02/03/2009  15:41  Page 7T1 = t1wL1 (16)
The impact of a change in the first-period tax rate on first-period tax
revenues is given by: 
dT1/dt1 = [dw/dt1] [(1 – t1) – {t1 (1 – α) / α} + R(L2/ L1)(1 – t2)] L1 (17)
We saw in the earlier one-period model that the equivalent expression had
the same sign as α – t, i.e. as capital’s share in income minus the income-tax
rate, and that these terms recorded the same values for 1987. In the present
two-period model we see that for α = t, the overall impact of an increase in the
first-period tax rate on first-period tax revenues is positive. Hence a first-
period tax reduction would reduce first-period tax revenues and move the
economy closer to or beyond the catastrophic “trigger point”. This violates the
policy constraint that we impose in situations of fiscal crisis.
We now wish to explore the consequences of reducing second-period rather
than first-period taxes, where the union again maximises Equation (13).
dw/dt2 = [b/(1 – α)] [1 + R(L2/L1)] R(L2/L1) / [(1 – t1) 
+ R(L2/L1)(1 – t2)]2  >  0 (18)
As in the case of a first-period tax cut, a second-period tax cut also reduces
the multi-period wage, stimulating investment and both first-period and
second-period employment levels.
First-period tax revenues are as in Equation (16), generating:
dT1/dt2 = [dw/dt2] t1 L1 [(α –1 ) / α)] < 0 (19)
Since capital’s share in income is less than unity, a second-period tax cut
under social partnership raises employment in both periods, while the growth
in first-period tax revenues might be thought to assist the economy in escaping
from fiscal crisis.
We now need to reflect a little more, however, on the exact meaning of this
last phrase. The discounted sum of tax revenues (DSTR) in the two-period
model is given by:
DSTR = T1 + R.T2
It transpires in our highly stylised model, however, that the impact of both
first-period and second-period tax reductions on the discounted sum of tax
revenues is zero when the income-tax rate (t1, t2) has the same value as
capital’s share in income (α). 
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and
d DSTR/dt2 = B–1  wRL2 [(1 – t1/α) + R(L2/L1) (1 – t2/α)] = 0 for t = α
where 
B = [(1 – t1) + R(L2/L1)(1 – t2)]
This means that the first-period and discounted second-period effects on
tax revenues are of equal and opposite sign.10
This last set of results suggests that partnership would have facilitated
exit from fiscal crisis only in a narrowly restricted sense. By moving the
economy away from the potentially catastrophic trigger point for a limited
period of time, it would have served as a holding action until fiscal expenditure
cuts were implemented and/or other exogenous tax receipts came on stream.
In the late 1980s, as Barry and Devereux (1995) have noted, Single Market-
related FDI inflows and buoyant world demand, particularly from the UK,
would have combined with the competitiveness gains analysed here to draw in
such further tax revenues. Taking these factors into account would require a
more complicated model, which is left for future research.
IV CONCLUDING  COMMENTS
The contribution of social partnership to Ireland’s economic boom remains
controversial. This paper presents a theoretical model of a small open economy
that analyses the contribution that a multi-period deal on wages and taxation
can make in stimulating competitiveness and maintaining the economy’s
distance from the critical debt level that can trigger a dramatic increase in the
risk premium payable on government debt.
Such a deal would not be possible in a spot labour market. Under the non-
spot labour market structures suggested by the high unemployment rates of
the late 1980s, such a deal can be struck.  Short-term tax reductions would
have worsened the short-term fiscal position. An agreement offering future tax
reductions in exchange for current wage moderation, on the other hand,
imparts a supply-side stimulus to the economy and improves the immediate
fiscal position. 
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10 This means of course that the tax reductions considered are consistent with an unchanged
pattern of fiscal expenditures, highlighting the fact that the present paper deals with a different
set of issues from those explored in the “expansionary fiscal contraction” literature.
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secure an outcome that is preferred by both unions and employers.11 The
answer relates to the Coase Theorem, which states that, in the absence of
transactions costs, interested parties will be able to bargain privately to
correct many types of market failure. As the monopoly-union equilibrium is
Pareto sub-optimal, the business sector – which stands to gain from a move to
a competitive labour-market equilibrium – should be able to compensate or
bribe the union to allow such an outcome. The underlying presumption then is
that transactions costs prevent the business sector from organising to secure
such a deal. On a practical level, this recognises that some of the firms that
would benefit would have gone out of business or would not even have come
into existence under the adverse competitiveness conditions associated with
the pre-partnership equilibrium, making it virtually impossible to secure their
contributions to the necessary compensation payment. The government,
however, as shown here, can co-ordinate such a Pareto-improving adjustment
via tax policy.   
Tax policy alone, however, cannot secure full employment while the
monopoly-union model holds sway.12 Full employment can emerge only
through a change in labour-market regime. Such a regime change could
possibly have come about in Ireland through former labour-market “outsiders”
attaining the status of “insiders” (Blanchard and Summers, 1987) or through
changes in the characteristics of the median voter who determines the
behaviour of organised labour. This is a process, and a modelling challenge,
that appears worthy of exploration.13
Finally, one might wish to speculate as to whether partnership might be
able to play an equivalent role in the current recessionary environment. Let
us consider this in terms of the demand for further income tax reductions and
the willingness or ability of the government to provide them. On the demand
side, the first point to note is that tax reductions are likely to have had a
higher priority for the electorate at the higher levels of public debt prevailing
in the late 1980s, since high debt-service payments obscure the relationship
between public service provision and the level of taxes paid. A related point is
that the perceived marginal benefit of income tax reductions has arguably
declined in recent years as attention has shifted to apparent deficiencies in the
level of public services provided. On the supply side, since the income tax
10 THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL REVIEW
11 Recall that fiscal expenditures remain constant throughout the analysis. 
12 Note that even for t1= t2 = 0 in Equation (14), the union-determined wage exceeds the
opportunity cost of labour, b. 
13 Since it is not addressed here, the paper has nothing to say about the consequences of
partnership under full employment conditions. 
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sources of revenue such as stamp duty, the recent collapse in these revenue
streams would seem to leave little room for further income tax reductions. 
It can only be hoped that Teahon’s view, as quoted at the outset, might
prove more accurate than this much gloomier assessment and that
partnership might have more than the one string to its bow that is the focus
of the present paper. 
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EXTENDING THE MODEL TO ALLOW FOR MIGRATION
There are a number of ways in which international migration can be
modelled. Faini (1996) and Andersson and Forslid (2004) assume population
heterogeneity, where agents have varying preferences as to location. The
greater the utility difference across locations, the greater the proportion of the
population that migrates. The heterogeneity assumption makes welfare
analysis difficult however. Barry (2002) surmounts this by using a “taste for
variety” approach, in which the proportion of their lives that individuals
choose to spend at home and abroad is determined by the relative
attractiveness of each location. As in the population-heterogeneity approach,
this yields a type of imperfect labour mobility.
The basic Harris-Todaro (1970) model, by contrast, assumes perfect factor
mobility, though the transition to full equilibrium will not be immediate if
there are rising marginal costs of migration, as assumed by Barro and Sala-i-
Martin (1995, chapter 9) for example. For illustrative purposes, we derive
results for a perfect-foresight version of the Harris-Todaro model without
migration costs.14 Fitz Gerald (1999) and O’Rourke (1995) both propose the
Harris-Todaro model as a way of incorporating traditionally high Irish
unemployment. 
The model postulates an exogenous wage (w*) or exogenous labour-market
conditions in the external (i.e. UK) labour market, where the exogeneity
derives from the “small economy” assumption applying to Ireland. The
migration equilibrium is established by higher Irish unemployment, yielding: 
w* = wL/N (A1)
where w* is the exogenous UK wage, w is the Irish wage, and L/N is the Irish
employment rate.15
Amending the conventional model to allow for the monopoly-union
formulation, and assuming that perfect-foresight migration takes place at the
beginning of period 2, we have:
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14 Migration decisions can also be modelled as backward looking, as in Djajic and Purvis, 1987. 
15 Equation (A1) is consistent with high Irish unemployment only if Irish wages exceed those in
the UK. O’Rourke (1995) cites ILO data from the 1920s onwards that suggest that real wages
(adjusted for Ireland-UK purchasing power differences) were higher in Dublin than in London for
most years and most occupations. Fitz Gerald (1999, Figure 7.30) shows that non-PPP-adjusted
Irish hourly earnings fluctuated between 70 per cent and 90 per cent of UK levels over the course
of the 1980s and 1990s; in the presence of migration costs, Irish wages need not exceed those of
the UK even if Irish unemployment is higher.
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This yields:
N2 = {[w(1-t2) – b]/(w* – b)} L2 (A3)
The union-determined wage in this formulation is given by:
w = [b/[(1 – α)] [1 + R(L2/L1)Z] / [(1 – t1) + R(L2/L1)Z(1 – t2)] (A4)
where the new term Z = w*/(w* – b) distinguishes this expression from the
“closed labour market” Equation (14) in the text.
All the main qualitative results derived earlier go through under this
formulation. A first-period tax cut reduces the multi-period wage and
stimulates employment in both periods. The policy constraint is violated
however; the tax cut dominates the increase in the first-period wage bill so
that first-period tax revenues decline. A second-period tax cut also stimulates
the economy in both periods, with first-period tax revenues rising because of
the expanded wage bill. Hence, this latter policy satisfies the policy constraint.
A perhaps surprising result of the restrictive Harris-Todaro formulation is
that, as seen from Equation (A3), the labour-force response to an improvement
in Irish labour-market conditions is so strong that it dominates the second-
period employment response – a result of the extremely high elasticity of
labour supply in the Harris-Todaro model. This suggests that one or other of
the various formulations offering a less than perfect degree of labour mobility
may be more appropriate in modelling the Irish conditions of the early
partnership period.
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